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Abstract: Despite the consolidated body of public international law on children’s
rights and armed conflict, why do armed rebel groups and state forces deploy
children in armed conflict, particularly in Somalia? First, due to the lack of alter-
native sources of income and livelihood beyond armed conflict, children join the
army due to coercive recruitment by commanders of armed groups. Their partici-
pation in armed conflict generates a fleeting and false sense of material security
and belongingness in a group. Second, many Somali children were born in an
environment of existential violence and material insecurity that normalized and
routinized violence, thereby motivating them to view enlistment in armed conflict
as morally permissible and necessary for existential survival.
Keywords: armed conflict, children’s rights, child soldiers, Somalia, war, human
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1 Introduction
In its 2019 report, Save the Children – the global civil society organization dedi-
cated to children’s rights — maintained that minors today “have a better chance
than at any time in history to grow up healthy, educated and protected, with the
opportunity to reach their full potential.”1 Yet, many societal threats persist in
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ways that undermine the welfare and dignity of children. In fact, there are
approximately 240 million children in 2018 who live in conflict-embattled zones.2
Remarkably, the ground-breaking report to the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly contended that the presence of children in a conflict zone constitutes a
violation of “every right of a child – the right to life, the right to be with family and
community, the right to health, the right to the development of personality and the
right to be nurtured and protected.”3 The recruitment of children in wars is not
historically new, for example, children have been deployed during the Second
World War, the American Revolution, and the Civil War in Sierra Leone in the
1990s.4 These children have been recruited by government forces, armed rebel
groups, and even paramilitary groups. There is a wide variation in their involve-
ment in wars, as some of them are primarily engaged in the frontlines of armed
conflict, such as in suicide missions, while some of them function as spies or
messengers or are forced into sexual slavery. To recruit children, armed groups
often abduct them, while other children join armed rebellion out of desperation,
based on the belief that such groups offer their best chance for existential survival.
The phenomenon of children associated with armed forces or groups (CAAFG)
is not new, as it has evolved along with the changing characteristics of war.
Notably, weapons have become smaller, lighter and easier to use, even without
the possession of specific competences5 – a technological development that
contributed to the relatively easier deployment of children as agents of war.
Because of the recent increase in the use of recruited children, the international
attention to the phenomenon gainedmore impetus. As shown in Table 1, according
to the 2017 UN Secretary-General’s report, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria were
some of the countries with the highest number of reported CAAFG that year.6 Yet,
armed forces (state or non-state actors) do not limit their recruitment efforts tar-
geting children within national boundaries. Rather, transnational armed rebel
2 Child Soldiers International (2018, July). Child Soldiers International Annual Report 2017–18.
London: Child Soldiers International. Available at: https://www.child-soldiers.org/shop/annual-
report-2017-18 Last accessed: 25.08.2020; Drumbl, M. (2012). Reimagining Child Soldiers in Inter-
national Law and Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 1.
3 Machel, G. (1996). Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. New York, United Nations. Available at:
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/51/306 Last accessed: 25.08.2020.
4 Rosen, D. (2015). Child Soldiers in the Western Imagination: From Patriots to Victims. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
5 Kaplan, E. (2005, December 2). Child Soldiers Around the World. Backgrounder. Council on
Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/child-soldiers-around-world
Last accessed: 25.08.2020.
6 UNGeneral Assembly Security Council (2018, May 16). Children and armed conflict. Report of the
Secretary-General. A/72/865-S/2018/465. Available at: https://undocs.org/s/2018/465 Last
accessed: 25.08.2020.
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groups, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State in the Middle East, have vigor-
ously recruited minors in the Global North, as demonstrated by the well-known
case of Shamima Begum from the United Kingdom.7 Notwithstanding, the
deployment of children in armed conflict constitutes a grave violation of the right
to life, including those rights of the most vulnerable individuals such as minors.
The year 2020 marked the 30th anniversary of the enforcement of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC has been almost universally
ratified with 196 parties to the convention, and it laid out the universal norms and
principles concerning children’s rights.9 Two additional protocolswere annexed to
the CRC: TheOptional Protocol to the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography (OPSC) and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of
children in armed conflict (OPAC). The latter specifically addressed CAAFG, setting
the minimum age of recruitment at 18 years and declaring states as responsible for
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7 Masters, M. & Regilme, S. (2020). Human Rights and British Citizenship: The Case of Shamima
Begum as Citizen to Homo Sacer. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2020, 1–23, doi: 10.1093/
jhuman/huaa029.
8 UNGeneral Assembly Security Council (2018, May 16). Children and armed conflict. Report of the
Secretary-General. A/72/865-S/2018/465. Available at: https://undocs.org/s/2018/465 Last
accessed: 26.08.2020.
9 UN General Assembly (1989, November 20). Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Na-
tions, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
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taking all feasible measures to prevent and halt the phenomenon.10 The CRC is
widely considered as an important step towards child protection. Although the
number of confirmed cases has globally decreased in recent years, considerable
progress has not been achieved in many countries at the national level.11
Over time, many states have committed to various international legal tools to
prohibit and prevent child recruitment, included in both international humani-
tarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, and
international human rights law, such as the CRC and the OPAC. Moreover, a
number of UN resolutions and international treaties have been produced over the
years to strengthen the norms around the issue.12 The vast majority of the world’s
nations signed and ratified these treaties.While the CRC has been ratified by all UN
members except for the US, the OPAC has been ratified by 170 countries, and the
Geneva Conventions have been ratified by all 196 countries and its three protocols
by 174, 169 and 77 respectively. Furthermore, scholars such as Vandenhole
recognize the limitations of the CRC, which has yet to become a solid, highly
effective legal instrument.13
Nevertheless, a number of these same states that formally agreed to comply
with the set of rules outlined in the treaties clearly deviate from them, thus not only
violating the international norms but committing grave violations of human rights.
The practice of recruiting children is unfortunately common in African countries,
where heads of state are not always compliant with their ratifications and, espe-
cially in countries afflicted bywar, children’s rights are often neglected. Achvarina
and Reich argue that, since 1975, Africa has witnessed the largest number of
conflicts, the increase of non-state armed groups, and consequently, the most
rapid intensification in the recruitment and use of children, thus becoming the
world’s hub of child soldiering.14 In 2017, Somalia recorded one of the largest
number of children killed at war (931), and the highest number of recruited and
10 UN General Assembly (2000, May 25). Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. A/RES/54/263. Available at: https://www.
ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/opaccrc.aspx Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
11 UN Human Rights Council (2019, December 24). Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. A/HRC/43/38. Available at: https://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/38&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC Last accessed: 27.
08.2020.
12 A list of the international norms, conventions, and treaties concerning the issue of child
soldiering can be found in Appendix 1.
13 Vandenhole, W. (2015). Children’s rights from a legal perspective: Children’s rights law. In
Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies. Routledge. pp. 43–58.
14 Achvarina, V.&Reich, S. F. (2006, Summer). No Place toHide: Refugees, DisplacedPersons, and
the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. Quarterly Journal: International Security, 31(1). pp. 127–164.
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used children in conflict (2127).15 Oncemore, in 2019, theUNHumanRights Council
reported Somalia as the state with the highest number of verified cases16 of child
recruitment.17
Somalis have experienced armed conflict in their land for decades. They
endured a war with neighboring countries like Ethiopia, a civil war that ended in
1991 with the ousting of the then-dictator Siad Barre from power, and a famine that
caused deaths and widespread diseases.18 In 2007, a new extremist Islamist
organization, al-Shabaab – ‘youth’ in Arabic – emerged from the ashes of the
‘Islamic Courts Union’ and opposed the government, prompting another conflict,
first against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and then from 2012
onwards, against the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its Somali
National Army (SNA).19 The war has also been fought by numerous Somali clans
and smaller militias associated with either one of the factions and by external
actors, such as the regional peacekeeping mission under the name of African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).20 In this constant climate of insecurity,
whilst al-Shabaab continues to be biggest recruiting group for deploying children
in war, all the parties engaged in the conflict have actively recruited children in
armed services.21 As such, the widespread deployment of children in armed con-
flict constitutes a grave human rights crisis, which pushes the Somalian state to
comply with the relevant international and regional human rights treaties and
conventions that the country signed and ratified over the years.22
15 UNGeneral Assembly Security Council (2018,May 16).Children and armed conflict. Report of the
Secretary-General. A/72/865-S/2018/465. Available at: https://undocs.org/s/2018/465 Last
accessed: 25.08.2020.
16 The information provided by the government and the other belligerents are not reliable; thus,
the actual number of child soldiers is estimated to be much higher.
17 UN Human Rights Council (2019, December 24). Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. A/HRC/43/38. Available at: https://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/38&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC Last accessed: 27.
08.2020.
18 Lee Hogg, A. (2008, December). Timeline: Somalia, 1991–2008. From troubled to dire. The
Atlantic, Global, December 2008 Issue. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2008/12/timeline-somalia-1991-2008/307190/.
19 From this point on, both the TFG and the FGS forces will be referenced as ‘government forces’,
unless otherwise specified.
20 BBC (2018, January 4). Somalia profile – Timeline. BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-14094632.
21 HumanRightsWatch (2018, February). “It’s LikeWe’re Always in a Prison”. Abuses Against Boys
Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/report_pdf/somalia0218_web.pdf Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
22 A list of signed and ratified laws by Somalia can be found in Appendix 2.
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Thus, we ask the following core question: Despite the relatively consolidated
body of public international law on children’s rights and armed conflict, why do
armed rebel groups and state forces deploy children in armed conflict, particularly
in Somalia? Our core argument states that, among the various key factors that
supposedly explain the causes of CAAFG in Somalia, only two are found to be
demonstrably applicable for both the extremist organization al-Shabaab, and the
Somalian government and their allied forces. First, children may voluntarily join
the army or be recruited by the commanders because they lack alternatives for
livelihood outside of the armed groups, which generates a temporal yet false sense
of material security and group affinity. Second, Somali children were born in an
environment of existential violence and material insecurity that normalized and
routinized violence. That consequently reduced or removed their sense ofmorality,
thereby causing them to view enlistment in armed conflict as morally permissible
and necessary for existential survival. Both factors illustrate why recruiting chil-
dren remains a common practice in the Somali conflict. In this paper, we define
recruited children23 based on the 2007 Paris Principles:
any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force
or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as
fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a
child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.24
Notably, the recruitment of children is an extremely serious crime that still
involves approximately 200,000–500,00025 children as victims worldwide.26
Singer estimates that children are part of 40% of theworld armed forces, including
state armies, insurgent groups, and non-state armed rebel organizations, and they
fight in 75% of the conflicts taking place globally.27 By participating in armed
conflict, children are subjected to potential mental and physical injuries, and in
many cases, deaths. Interviewswith former CAAFG,who escaped orwere liberated
23 The term also refers to minors who voluntarily decide to join an armed group.
24 UNICEF (2007, February). The Paris Principles. Principles andGuidelines on Children Associated
with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/mali/media/1561/file/
ParisPrinciples.pdf Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
25 Thisfigure is considered to be an approximation since it is very problematic to have an accurate
number of all children recruited in armies at a global level.
26 Benrey, L. (2016, February 2). History of Child Soldiers Policies. End Slavery NOW. Available at:
https://www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/history-of-child-soldier-policies Last accessed: 26.
08.2020.
27 Singer, P. W. (2010). The Enablers of War: Causal Factors behind the Child Soldier Phenom-
enon. In Gates, S. and Reich, S. (eds.), Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 93–107.
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by the armies, reveal that participation in armed conflicts and witnessing killings,
rapes, beheadings of civilians, bombings, and other forms of blatant violence
constitute traumatizing experiences, thereby leaving physical and mental scars
long after these children have terminated their participation.28
Despite the large body of reports and articles produced by the UN and the
transnational human rights organizations, child recruitment remains on the side-
lines of the international community’s political and security agendas, which have
primarily focused onmatters of national security, nuclear weapons, and non-state
terrorism.29 Research on CAAFG has been conducted mainly by civil-society
organizations or think-tanks.30 However, in Somalia where, as in many other
cases, the issue of child recruitment has been reported for decades, the vast
majority of studies available have been conducted by non-governmental organi-
zations.31 In addition, these reports and investigations always distinguish between
the actions of al-Shabaab and the government. This paper, in contrast, will first
explain the factors of child recruitment for the two main sides involved in armed
conflict, and then analytically describe the two elements common to both to
understand the fundamental reasons for the widespread phenomenon in the
country. The deployment of recruited children in armed conflict constitutes a
global human rights crisis, in which global as well as regional human rights
institutions and states have yet to focus on. Indeed, the mobilization of children in
armed conflict could generate a generation of society beset in violence, insecurity,
and political instability.32
The next section reviews the relevant literature on CAAFG and the factors that
have been found worldwide at the basis of the phenomenon. The theory section
discusses in more detail our theoretical arguments on child recruitment as well as
the analytic approach, data sources, and methods used in our analysis. Next, the
paper will be divided into two substantive sections of our empirical analysis on the
causes of the participation of children in armed conflicts in Somalia. The first will
28 Schauer, E. & Elbert, T. (2010). The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering. In Martz, E. (ed.),
Trauma Rehabilitation After War and Conflict: Community and Individual Perspectives. New York:
Springer. pp. 311–360.
29 Achvarina, V. & Reich, S. F. (2006, Summer). No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons,
and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. Quarterly Journal: International Security, 31(1). pp. 127–164.
30 Haer, R. (2019). Children and armed conflict: looking at the future and learning from the past.
Third World Quarterly, 40(1). pp. 74–91; Tynes, R. & Early, B. R. (2015). Governments, Rebels, and
the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007. Peace Eco-
nomics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 21(1). p. 3
31 Achvarina, V. & Reich, S. F. (2006, Summer). No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons,
and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. International Security, 31(1). p. 131.
32 Ibid.
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review the different rationales for each side to the conflict to explain their use and
recruitment of recruited children. Subsequently, the second chapter will explore
the findings of the research, namely the two common factors pushing children to
‘voluntarily’ join either al-Shabaab or the government’s forces and allies. The first
factor being that in the context of war, when children may have lost caregivers,
they do not have external support and may see the army as a ‘safe’ harbour to
acquire food, shelter and a minimum salary to help their families. The second
factor is that Somali children have only ever experienced conflict in their country
and have ‘normalized’ violence, which brings about the idea that fighting is the
only way to put an end to the war. The final section will present the conclusions of
the article, where the findings will also be considered in the broader discussion of
the international discourse of child recruitment and conflict studies.
1.1 State of Knowledge: Recruited Children
We underscore that child recruitment in armed forces is prohibited under different
domestic, regional, and international treaties and conventions, and that the
recruitment of children in armed conflict constitutes a grave violation of human
rights. Since the end of the Cold War, human rights have obtained increased
international attention, but universal compliance remains a key challenge for all
states. In recent years, human rights have been codified and institutionalized in
domestic and international legal structures, and the number of related covenants
and treaties has risen exponentially. Certain countries, however, have witnessed a
deterioration of human rights standards.33 On the one hand, some scholars claim
that domestic elements need to be closely observed to better understand the
conditions under which governments comply with human rights norms.34 Sim-
mons theorizes that the most powerful mechanisms able to influence a state’s
decision to comply with human rights treaties are litigations, new agendas,
and social mobilization.35 The author found that states were more likely to fulfil
33 Regilme Jr, Salvador Santino F. (2019). The global politics of human rights: From human rights
to human dignity? International Political Science Review, 40(2). pp. 279–290.
34 Hafner-Burton, E. (2013).Making human rights a reality. Princeton University Press.; Regilme,
S. (2020). Human rights and humanitarian interventions in the international arena. In D. Berg-
SchlosserB. Badie & L. Morlino The SAGE handbook of political science (Vol. 3, pp. 1456–1473). 55
City Road, London: SAGE Publications Ltd doi: 10.4135/9781529714333.n89.
35 Simmons, B. (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8 S. S. Jr. F. Regilme and E. Spoldi
international norms, particularly concerning civil and political rights, when their
populations had both reasons and means to succeed in fighting for their rights.36
On the other hand, others assert that, when analyzing human rights violations,
it is necessary to consider the interdependence between domestic, regional, and
transnational factors, which can be considered predominant causes for national
political changes.37 The hypothesis maintains that the analysis on human rights
abuses cannot be entirely grounded on domestic politics. Instead, transnational
and regional factors are important key elements that enable the academic, as well
as the international debate, to discuss the role played by foreign aid, economic
trade and political interventions in human rights abuses, especially in weak and
small states.38
Multiple factors could explain the problem of CAAFG. These elements are
conceptually distinct from each other, yet they can co-exist in situations of conflict,
and they usually overlap andmutually reinforce one another – therebymaking the
recruitment and use of children a persisting and evolving issue. These factors can
be categorized into four clusters of literature: domestic,material, ideational factors
and inherent characteristics of children. In addition to these four categories, it is
important to touch upon the academic debate on the international elements that
affect the phenomenon. Notwithstanding the widespread adoption by states of
relevant international treaties, it remains difficult to implement effectively such
commitments inways that couldminimize the proliferation of recruited children.39
1.2 Domestic Factors
Domestic factors pertain to those variables within a country, where child recruit-
ment occurs. The majority of states in which this happens are considered in the
literature as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed states’, wherein violence, civil war, and corrupt
governments lead to weak institutions, the collapse of most infrastructures,
negative economic growth rates, and the considerable lowering of the population
living conditions.40 In conflict-ridden areas, children may join an armed group to
seek food, a certain level of security that cannot be provided outside, money or
36 Ibid.
37 Regilme Jr, Salvador Santino F. (2014). The social science of human rights: the need for a
‘second image reversed’? Third World Quarterly, 35(8). pp. 1390–1405.
38 Ibid.
39 Francis, D. J. (2007). ‘Paper protection’ mechanisms: child soldiers and the international
protection of children in Africa’s conflict zones. Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(2). pp. 2017–
231.
40 Barma, N. H. (2013, March 29). Failed state. Britannica – Government. Available at: https://
www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
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material benefits, medical care, and more generally, a means to survive. In this
context, children often lack a stable education and viable alternatives and see the
militias as their only way to provide for themselves and their families.41 In a report
on child combatants in Colombia, Brett found that most of the volunteer recruits
joined the guerrillas to escape domestic violence, poverty, and/or lack of educa-
tion, thinking that an armed group could improve their status.42 When war is
fought among civilians, children may witness their loved ones’ deaths and
suffering; another push factor to join the forces and fight the attackers.43 In liter-
ature, however, this factor has been debated among scholars. Achvarina andReich
argue that it is an oversimplifiedmotive since in somewar zones children are not in
any case willing to join an armed organization, even when their living conditions
could drive them to do so.44
Material causes include those elements that generate financial advantages to
the rebel army that recruits children, or that are push factors facilitating the use of
minors in militias. For armed rebel groups, children are considered to be conve-
nient, cheap, and expendable tools. Accordingly, children are viewed as having
fewer material demands, as they are not paid as adults, do not need to be well-
clothed or well-sheltered, and can be easily replaced.45 Moreover, in the Global
South, child recruitment in wars is also sustained by a demographic element,
whereby the majority of populations consist of underage youth.46 In this scenario,
adolescent minors are at risk as militias often recruit them due to their physical
resemblance to adults that can, therefore, deceive monitoring mechanisms.47
Another notable material factor refers to children’s adaptability to succumb to
authority. In fact, children are frequently used for non-combatant roles such as
41 Wessells, M. (2006). Child Soldiers from Violence to Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
42 Brett, S. (2003). You’ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia. Human Rights Watch.
43 Beber, B. & Blattman, C. (2013). The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion. International Orga-
nization, 67(1). pp. 65–104. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-
organization/article/logic-of-child-soldiering-and-coercion/EB8CC2FE13CC49C2846EEDE4FFD432FE
Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
44 Achvarina, V. & Reich, S. F. (2006, Summer). No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons,
and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. Quarterly Journal: International Security, 31(1). pp. 127–164.
45 Dallaire, R. A. &Humphreys, J. D. (2011).They fight like soldiers, they die like children: The global
quest to eradicate the use of child soldiers. Toronto: Vintage Canada.
46 Vautravers, A. J. (2009). Why Child Soldiers are Such a Complex Issue. Refugee Survey Quar-
terly, 27(4). pp. 96–107.
47 Wessells, M. (2006). Child Soldiers from Violence to Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
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guards, cooks, spies, carriers, sex slaves, etc.48 As described by Becker, Maoist
forces in Nepal abducted a vast number of children and principally used them as
porters, spies, guards, and to help themilitias with political mobilization during the
civil war.49 Adult rebel leaders forcibly command girl soldiers to perform a range of
duties,while such adult rebels objectify and exploit those girls for sexual pleasure.50
In Liberia and Uganda, boys were mainly deployed to the battlefield, while girls
were coerced to carry out sexual services.51 In Sierra Leone, the commanders would
raise their status by marrying the highest number of child brides.52
Some technological advancements in military weapons contributed to the
widespread use of children in conflicts. Rosen links the phenomenon of child
recruitment to the trade of small, lightweight arms. Children can carry, decon-
struct, and assemble these weapons easily with their smaller hands, thereby
making thoseweapons easy to use during combat.53 The 2000BamakoDeclaration
on an African Common Position on Small and Light Arms Proliferation asserted
that:
we express our grave concern that the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and
trafficking of small arms and light weapons continues to have devastating […] consequences
on children, a number of whom are victims of armed conflict, while others are forced to
become child soldiers.54
Children have not yet completely built their own identity and are still searching for
a set of beliefs to adhere to and a community in which to belong. In contexts of
conflict, it is easier for commanders and armed groups to indoctrinate boys and
48 Kononenko, I. (2016). Prohibiting the Use of Child Soldiers: Contested Norm in Contemporary
Human Rights Discourse. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 34(2). pp. 89–103.
49 Becker, J. (2010). Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. In Gates, S. & Reich, S.
(eds.), Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp.
108–120.
50 Masters, M. & Regilme, S. (2020). Human Rights and British Citizenship: The Case of Shamima
Begum as Citizen to Homo Sacer. Journal of Human Rights Practice. doi: 10.1093/jhuman/huaa029
pp. 1–23.
51 Thompson, C. (2001, June 18). Beyond Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique.
Review of African Political Economy, 80. pp. 191–206.
52 Mazurana, D. & McKay, S. (2001). Child Soldiers. What about the Girls? Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 57(5). pp. 30-35.
53 Rosen, D. M. (2005). War and Childhood. In Rosen, D. M., Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in
War and Terrorism. London: Rutgers University Press.
54 Organization of African Unity (OAU), (2000). Bamako Declaration on an African Common
Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Available at: http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/AU/Bamako%20Declaration.pdf
Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
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girls and push worldviews that frame war as a necessary mode for their individual
and collective survival. In Asian conflicts, indoctrination played an incisive role in
the recruitment of children in armies due to the explicit political agenda of many
militias.55 Particularly, in Sri Lanka, the rebel forces opposed to the government
carried out methodical propaganda campaigns in schools to indoctrinate and re-
cruit children. The programs consisted of parades and special events for children
exhibiting war equipment, describing the abuse and suffering that minors were
forced to live through, and showing speeches or movies about their fight for
independence portraying them as heroes.56 At this age, children lack a sense of
prudence and cannot often compellingly distinguish right from wrong, and once
they have been coerced and persuaded of the belligerents’motives, themere fact of
pertaining to the armed organizations acquires meaning and purpose.57
The last category of causal factors includes supposedly intrinsic features often
attributed to children. Children are widely considered to be easily controlled,
exploitable, and more responsive to threats and physical violence than adults,
thereby making them pliable to orders. Furley’s research in Mozambique revealed
that theMozambiqueNational Resistance preferred children because commanders
could intimidate them enough to avoid escape attempts, which in contrast, often
occurred with adults.58 Furthermore, brutality and terror, as well as ‘spiritual
magic’ or voodoo rites, have been found to be effective in manipulating children
and coerce them to follow the instructions from their officials, also elevating their
loyalty to the troops and to the causes for the war.59 In several countries, including
Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Colombia, small
units of naked recruited children would be sent to initiate battles in order to
confuse the enemy, who would be appalled, thus giving an advantage to the army
using children.60 In fact, taking advantage of the shock value, recruiters consid-
ered children as effective tools for sowing confusion during warfare.
55 Becker, J. (2010). Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. In Gates, S. & Reich, S.
(eds.), Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp.
108–120.
56 Ibid.
57 Wessells, M. (2006). Child Soldiers from Violence to Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
58 Furley, O. (1995). ‘Child Soldiers in Africa’ in Furley, O. (ed.) Conflict in Africa. London: I.B.
Tauris Publishers.
59 Dallaire, R. A. &Humphreys, J. D. (2011).They fight like soldiers, they die like children: The global
quest to eradicate the use of child soldiers. Toronto: Vintage Canada.
60 Singer, P. W. (2005). Children at War. New York: Pantheon.
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1.2.1 International Elements
The three main instruments employed by the international community to prevent
and stop the practice have been sanctions, including travel bans, economic
restrictions, and arms embargoes, directed to perpetrators of child recruitment.61
Another technique is ‘naming and shaming’, which involves the use of UN annual
reports and official statements to call out the states violating the rights and dignity
of CAAFG, in order to make those rebel groups and the relevant national govern-
ments accountable for their abuses.62 Finally, the criminalization of the recruitment
of children in armed conflict was accomplished by the International Criminal Court
through the prosecutions, convictions, and sentences of Thomas Lubanga, a war
criminal from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Charles Taylor, former
president of Liberia.63 However, this mechanism of prevention and eradication of
child recruitment is highly contentious. Some scholars state that the criminal
prosecution and potential conviction of CAAFG’s recruiters still represent only a
minor progress towards the prevention of abuses or the promotion of justice.64
Meanwhile, Gates and Reich argued that tools such as criminalization may also
become an obstacle in reaching peace agreements because, if perpetrators of child
recruitment fear the possibility of prosecution once the war is over, then the
probability ofnot resorting to armsdisarmament increases.65 Other scholars such as
Francis define conventions and treaties as ‘paper protection’, since it cannot be
conclusively determined that they are effective in protecting children from
recruitment and use in armed conflict.66 He also argues that many African states, in
order to preserve their sovereignty, do not perceive themselves as subject to the law
nor implement its rules in their domestic legislation.67 On the subject of child
protection, Grover states that there is the urgency to incorporate the OPAC in in-
ternational human right law as an absolute prohibition of the use and recruitment
61 Haer, R. (2019). Children and armed conflict: looking at the future and learning from the past.
Third World Quarterly, 40(1). pp. 74–91.
62 Lleshi, A. (2018). How Can the International Community Best Respond to the Problem of Child
Soldiers? ILIRIA International Review, 8(1).
63 Haer, R. (2019). Children and armed conflict: looking at the future and learning from the past.
Third World Quarterly, 40(1). pp. 74–91.
64 Drumbl, M. A. (2012). Child Soldiers and Clicktivism: Justice, Myths, and Prevention. Journal of
Human Rights Practice, 4(3). pp. 481–485.
65 Gates, S. & Reich, S. (2010). Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press.
66 Francis, D. J. (2007). ‘Paper protection’ mechanisms: child soldiers and the international pro-
tection of children in Africa’s conflict zones. Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(2). pp. 2017–231.
67 Ibid.
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of children in armed conflict by any actor involved.68 He stresses the need to
implement the Geneva Convention’s provision on the ‘genocidal forcible transfer of
children’ and use it to prosecute and convict the perpetrators of child soldiering.69
On the other hand,Waschefort argues that an implementation of norms concerning
CAAFG does not require major changes in public international law but a constant
reassessment and improvement of all the currently existing judicial instruments.70
The aforementioned factors gather all the elements recognized as the main
factors that facilitate the recruitment and mobilization of children in war. Never-
theless, not all factors are found in countries where child recruitment is a practice;
generally, each case has distinctive characteristics and the phenomenon can be
more or less affected by a unique set of domestic, cultural, social, and political
conditions. Among the factors discussed above, it is possible to find two elements
that are particularly relevant for understanding the political logic of CAAFG in the
Somali conflict. The next section elaborates themain theoretical arguments of this
paper concerning recruited children.
1.3 Theory and Arguments: Recruited Children in Somalia
Our core analytic objective inquires on the causes of the deployment of children as
agents of war in contemporary Somalia. Our main argument states that children
have been recruited and mobilized in Somalia by the armed rebel group
al-Shabaab and the government’s forces and allies, for different reasons. Never-
theless, only two elements appear to be applicable for both groups.
First, the reasons for child recruitment and deployment differ for al-Shabaab
and the Somalian government. The two sides and their associated militias
generally employ children for different purposes and with different methods. On
the one hand, al-Shabaab’s commanders carry out forced recruitments and
abductions in public spaces such as schools, markets, villages, and crowded
streets.71 After the recruitment, children are sent to training camps where they are
taught how to fight and are assigned duties, such as combat, intelligence gath-
ering, becoming suicide bombers, spying, cooking, carrying loads, or guarding the
68 Grover, S. (2013). Child soldiers as victims of ‘genocidal forcible transfer’: Darfur and Syria as
case examples. The International Journal of Human Rights, 17(3), 411–427.
69 Ibid.
70 Waschefort, G. (2014). International Law and Child Soldiers. Bloomsbury Publishing.
71 US Department of State (2011). Somalia 2011 Human Rights Report. Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2011 – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available at: https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/country/somalia-topical Last accessed: 10.09.2020.
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army’s camps.72 On the other hand, although there have been few verified cases of
abductions from the government security forces, children are still significantly
present in the SNA. Amongst the government’s troops, recruited children are
largely used as regular soldiers or to guard checkpoints.73 In addition, it is difficult
to ascertainwhether all themilitias supporting the state do complywith applicable
laws that prohibit the deployment of children in armed conflict. This deficiency in
information, together with the lack of methodical monitoring mechanisms that
ensure minors are excluded from armed conflict, make it easy to keep children
inside the troops.74
Second, voluntary recruitment is found to be a shared feature, and two factors
are common to both factions. First, children are recruited by the armed group or
may join voluntarily, due to the lack of viable alternatives for means of survival.
Many children in Somalia come from financially impoverished backgrounds or
from villages that have been heavily devastated by a war. Therefore, commanders
persuade children through, often false, promises of money and other material
benefits, and these children are consequently attracted by the idea of being able to
provide for their families and acquire food, shelter, and a certain level of protec-
tion. In addition, Somali children were born and raised in a persistent climate of
insecurity and widespread violence, which motivated them to believe that war is
the only feasible strategy to fight for their freedom, identity, and values, regardless
of whether rebels or government forces help them fulfil a nationalistic sentiment
that arises from wanting to protect their country and regions, and to take revenge
for the recurring abuses perpetrated by the belligerents.
Table 2 shows the aforementioned differences between al-Shabaab and the
government armies and highlights their shared features that will be further
investigated in the analysis.
In this paper, we draw some theoretical perspectives from the literature on
conflict studies, international law, and human rights scholarship. The dynamics
between war, conflicts, and human rights are complex, prone to change, and
contingent upon political, legal, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Violations
of human rights are frequently attributed as consequences of armed conflicts,
which generate immense suffering for the community, undermine the dignity of
individuals affected by violence, and the long-term detrimental consequences of
72 Human Rights Watch (2012, February 20). No Place for Children. Child Recruitment, Forced




74 Amnesty International (2011, July). In the Line of Fire. Somalia’s Children Under Attack. AFR 52/
001/2011. London: Amnesty International Ltd.
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armed conflict on socio-economic systems.75 This is especially true when wars are
launched in the name of ethnic, territorial, or religious claims, and new violations
are perpetrated, by one or both parties involved, as the crisis intensifies.76 Such
abuses can also be politicized, as Regilme describes, as repressive measures
initiated by state actors to remove behavioral threats from opponents and insur-
gents.77 Although insurgencies or civil wars might be launched to promote ideo-
logical or political agendas, advance aminority’s group rights, or access resources,
they can result in the unlawful involvement of civilians, in systematic abuses,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.78 Hafner-Burton asserts that contexts of
conflict generate human rights abuses mainly because violations become justified
or even virtuous when put in terms of extraordinary measures carried out to
increase state’s security.79 Consequently, when aggression becomes routinized, it
Table : Differences in recruitingmethods and use of children in al-Shabaab and the government
armies.
Al-Shabaab The government forces
Recruiting
methods
– Abductions in schools, markets,
crowded streets, public spaces.
– Admission of voluntary child
enlistees in the army.
– Recruitment through propaganda
campaigns.
– Admission of voluntary child en-
listees in the army.
Reasons for use
of CAAFG
– Suicide-bombers to commit terrorist
attacks in strategic locations.
– Combat duties.
– Domestic duties in al-Shabaab
camps.
– Spies, guards, porters, intelligence
gatherers.
– Combat duties (also used as ‘shields’
to protect adult soldiers).
– Girls are given in marriage to officers
or used as sex slaves.
75 Sriram, C. L., Martin-Ortega, O., Herman, J. (2018). War, Conflict and Human Rights. London:
Routledge.
76 Ibid.
77 Regilme Jr, Salvador Santino F. (2014). The social science of human rights: the need for a
‘second image reversed’? Third World Quarterly, 35(8). pp. 1390–1405.
78 Hafner-Burton, E. (2013). Making Human Rights a Reality. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
79 Ibid.
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generates cycles of violence in the entire society, and lastly, war gravely
undermines the social controls within the community and creates conditions of
crisis.80
A shared notion when discussing child recruitment is that, although it is not a
novel practice, it has notably increased during the 21st century. Rosen claims
that ‘new’wars have drastically changed from the past.81 They are technologically
more developed, but the proliferation of new, small and light arms made recruit-
ment of children more widespread.82 Taking this internal aspect into consider-
ation, Samphansakul offers three hypotheses on the correlation between child
recruitment in armed forces and civil wars.83 He claims that the on-going civil war,
the duration of it, and the death rate of the conflict are all elements affecting the
possibility that CAAFG will be employed by non-state actors, as well as by the
government.84 Finally, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees is strongly linked with a higher possibility that children will be recruited
in the fighting.85 A further global study found that oftentimes the incentives that
push governments and insurgents to use children are influenced by rebel mobi-
lization, the intensity of the conflict, and the government’s degree of militariza-
tion.86 The research also suggests that the international community should have
the duty to effectivelymonitor and intervenewhen internal conflicts are brutal and
protracted, even though these are the same reasons why it can be difficult to
interfere in such wars.87
80 Ibid.
81 Rosen, D. M. (2005). War and Childhood. In Rosen, D. M., Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in
War and Terrorism. London: Rutgers University Press.
82 Singer, P. W. (2010). The Enablers of War: Causal Factors behind the Child Soldier Phenom-
enon. In Gates, S. and Reich, S. (eds.), Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 93–107.
83 Samphansakul, A. (2008). Child Soldiers and Intrastate Armed Conflicts: An Analysis of the
Recruitment of Child Soldiers in Civil Wars Between 2001 and 2003. University of North Texas.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid; As … explains, the higher possibility that children living in IDP camps in countries
affected by conflicts will be recruited, derives from the fact that in IDP camps, parents’ ability to
provide for their families and their authority lessens. Moreover, in this context, children often do
not receive education and have little prospects of permanent employment. Therefore, their vul-
beranility to be recruited by the armed forces increases (Lischer, S. K. (2006).War, Displacement,
and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. Wake Forest University).
86 Tynes, R. & Early, B. R. (2015). Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal
Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007. Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy,
21(1). pp. 79–110.
87 Ibid.
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To answer the research puzzle, this article will make use of a single case study:
child recruitment in Somalia and the involvement of all key actors engaged in the
armed conflict. We cover key political developments in Somalia from 2007 to 2017
because this time frame corresponds to the rise of al-Shabaab and to the peak of the
war. This decade has seen a tremendous increase in the recruitment and use of
children in armed conflict, yet, the phenomenon, in the Somali context, has been
understudied in the scholarly literature. We refer to primary sources including
documents published by the UN (such as UNICEF), verifiable and reliable news
articles, as well as official texts of international law, such as the CRC and its
Additional Protocol, the Paris Principles, the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, and all other relevant open-access documents related to child
recruitment in armed conflict.We also refer to secondary sources that include peer-
reviewed articles, books, reports by international organizations working in the
field of human and children’s rights, including Human Rights Watch (HRW),
Amnesty International, World Vision, Save the Children, and previously con-
ducted research on the topic.
Unfortunately, we face particular constraints and limitations in our analysis of
the case of Somalia. It was not possible to conduct fieldwork in Somalia due to
serious safety issues, but it is important that the violations of human rights and
dignity of Somali children have to be brought into more focus in studying the
intersections of international human rights law and armed conflict. Most impor-
tantly, we overcome such a constraint through the employment of data triangu-
lation, which deployed as many reliable and different primary and secondary
sources as possible, particularly those coming from organizations with nominally
distinctive interests. In that way, we cross-verified empirical data that are relevant
to our case study by referring to various sources.88
1.3.1 The Case Study Explained: Somalia
After gaining independence from Italy and Great Britain in 1960, Somalia entered a
phase of considerable political instability consisting of several changes at the
highest level of power and of consequent fights for authority and control of the
country. The first democratically elected president, AdamAbdullahOsman, united
the Italian and British territories and governed for seven years.89 Osman was
succeeded by Ali Sharmarke, who was assassinated in 1969 and replaced by
88 Flick, U. (2002). An introduction to qualitative research (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications.
89 Al Jazeera (2016, November 2). Somalia: The Forgotten Story. Available at: https://www.
aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2016/10/somalia-forgotten-story-161027115655140.
html Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
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Mohamed Hussein, whose presidency lasted only six days and culminated in a
military coup conducted by General Siad Barre. The coup terminated Somalia’s
democratic period and marked the beginning of a 22-year-long dictatorship that
ended in 1991.90
Nonetheless, it was during these decades that Somalia underwent remarkable
socio-political transformation, as Barre’s regime facilitated the increase in the
population’s literacy level and received political support from the United States
(US).91 However, he suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, while
also banning political parties and suppressing press freedom.92 In 1977, General
Barre’s army invaded Ethiopia in the Ogaden region, thereby starting a conflict
against the neighboring country. Ethiopia, backed by Soviet aid, which included
Cuban troops and soldiers fromYemen andNorth Korea, forced the Somali army to
withdraw, defeating Somalia in the war.93 Since then, the opposition against Barre
gained momentum until 1988, when the Northern Somali tribes took control of the
region nowknown as Somaliland.94 In 1991, southern and northernmilitias, finally
deposed Siad Barre, ending his 22 years of absolute power.95
Nevertheless, the country did not return to a relatively peaceful period. The
collapse of Barre’s government resulted in the civil war, which brought about a
serious humanitarian crisis and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission
from 1992 to 1995.96 In 1998, a second northern region, Puntland, gained a semi-
90 Ibid.
91 For further discussions on how powerful states impact regime survival, see: Regilme, S. (2021).
Aid Imperium: United States Foreign Policy andHumanRights in Post-ColdWar Southeast Asia. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
92 Ibid.
93 Yared, E. (2016, March 21). Ethiopian-Somali War over the Ogaden Region (1977–1978). Avail-
able at: https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/ethiopian-somali-war-over-ogaden-
region-1977-1978/ Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
94 Notwithstandingwith several challenges, the newly independent Somalilandwas able to keep
a peaceful, self-governing, secure state during the conflict that afflicted the rest of the country
(Bradbury, 2008). The government of Somaliland was a pioneer in guaranteeing protection to
children from conflict and in giving them free education (Lasley & Thyne, 2015: 296; Save The
Children, 2010).
95 Al Jazeera (2016, November 2). Somalia: The Forgotten Story. Available at: https://www.
aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2016/10/somalia-forgotten-story-161027115655140.
html Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
96 UN.int (n.d.). Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations. Country Facts.
Available at: https://www.un.int/somalia/somalia/country-facts Last accessed: 15.08.2020.
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autonomous status, thereby providing a relatively safer setting for its
population.97,98
In 2001, the UNwithdrew from the country, and the US, suspecting Somalia of
being an al-Qaida hideaway, declared its intention to advance military operations
in the country. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somaliawas elected in
2004 in Kenya to guide the country out of its crisis, and it only returned to Somali
territory in 2006.99
In 2007, the radical Islamist organization al-Shabaab transformed into the
most powerful Somali rebel militant group.100 In February of the same year, the
African Union sent a peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, to support the federal
government in its struggle against al-Shabaab. One year later, the US declared
al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization, halting all financial aid to it. Since their
emergence, al-Shabaab started a campaign largely made up of terrorist attacks in
Somalia, as well as in neighboring countries.101 The famine of 2011 drove the
country into a more serious humanitarian crisis, while the war between the gov-
ernment and al-Shabaab kept advancing. In 2012, besides blocking the Red Cross
and other aid sources from operating, al-Shabaab declared their affiliation with
al-Qaeda, establishing an even more dangerous connection in terms of terrorism
and resources.
After years of transitional governance, in 2012, Somalis elected president
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and adopted the provisional constitution of the Federal
Government of Somalia, denoting a sign of hope both at the national and inter-
national level. The year 2013 marked the first international recognition of the
97 In recent years the regions of Somaliland and Puntland repeatedly clashed over territories.
Although, the two regions managed to enjoy relative stability during the Somali fight against al-
Shabaab, this new escalation of violence could destabilize the two regions, as well as the country
even further (International Crisis Group, 2018). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, it will
not take into consideration the newdevelopments in Somaliland and Puntland, but it will focus on
the Somali civil war against al-Shabaab.
98 UNICEF (2016). Situation Analysis of Children in Somalia 2016. Available at: https://www.
unicef.org/somalia/media/986/file/Somalia-situation-analysis-of-children-in-Somalia-
2016-summary.pdf Last accessed: 15.08.2020.
99 BBC (2018, January 4). Somalia profile – Timeline. BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-14094632.
100 Wise, R. (2011, July). Al Shabaab.AqamFutures Project: Case Study Series, Case StudyNumber 2.
101 Rice, X. (2010, July 12). Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74. Available at: https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks Last accessed:
26.08.2020.
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Somali government since decades.102 Notwithstanding, peace and security did not
endure, and armed conflict intensified in the following years.
Piracy contributes to further destabilization in Somalia. In 2008, the first UN
resolution was issued in order to tackle the robbery and piracy crisis in the region.
However, the lack of competent political parties able to address development and
poverty left space for pirates to emerge and build their economic power by
hijacking and attacking ships off the coast of Somalia, in the Indian Ocean.103
These groups also make use of children as (pirates) soldiers and exploit them for
their own interests.104,105
In 2017, a new wave of hope was brought by the election of Mohamed
Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’. While al-Shabaab has lost control over several territories, the
government andAMISOMhave not yet gained control of the entirety of the country,
which still suffers violence from both sides.
2 – The Differences in Recruitment and
Deployment of Children
2.1 Al-Shabaab
The growth of al-Shabaab intensified the conflict and triggered substantial risks for
the population to be caught in the middle of the civil war. The rising number of
children recruited by the group reflected its gain of control over territories in
central and south Somalia, where they imposed strict rules of conduct.106 Forced
recruitment of adults and children became a regular practice in 2009. The
following year, Amnesty International interviewed Somali refugees finding that
the possibility of children being recruited was amongst the reasons for fleeing.107
102 Talsky, L. E. (2018, September 4). Somalia Country Report: Children and Security. The Roméo
Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative. Available at: https://www.childsoldiers.org/publications/
somalia-country-report/ Last accessed: 15.08.2020.
103 Reva, D. (2018). Ten years on, is Somali piracy still a threat? ISS Today. Available at: https://
issafrica.org/iss-today/ten-years-on-is-somali-piracy-still-a-threat Last accessed: 15.08.2020.
104 Although child-piracy is a further violation of children’s rights by Somali armed groups, this
paper will not take into consideration the role of piracy, as they do not have political or ideological
goals, and thus have not directly partaken in the conflict between al-Shabaab and the government.
105 Drumbl, M.A. (2013). Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability. Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 46(1). pp. 235–278.
106 Amnesty International (2011, July). In the Line of Fire. Somalia’s Children Under Attack. AFR
52/001/2011. London: Amnesty International Ltd.
107 Ibid.
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Initially, al-Shabaab targeted children from extremely poor districts, not only in
Somalia but also in Kenya. However, as the group expanded its influence, it also
started aiming at university students, offering themmoney and regular salaries.108
The recruiting method used by al-Shabaab varies from luring children with
gifts andmoney to directly threatening themor their families. In addition,militants
started abducting children by raiding schools, markets, playgrounds and crowded
outdoor locations.109 Particularly, in the areas under al-Shabaab’s influence,many
of the men fighting for the group draft children from their own families to support
the war. Furthermore, recruiters force clan elders to deliver a predetermined quota
of children desired by the army.110 Lastly, a number of children join the guerrilla,
driven by the prospect of escaping poverty. A notable feature is that the al-Shabaab
frequently punishes, flogs, or even kills the children or the members of their
families in public when they refuse to enlist.111
Al-Shabaab’s brutal practices show that themain reasons for child recruitment
are to replace and to increase the available soldiers. However, the organization
also employs children for supporting roles, including cooking; gathering infor-
mation; carrying water, ammunition and heavy loads for other soldiers; guarding
the camps; or pressuring potential recruits among their peers to join the army.112
Furthermore, al-Shabaab benefits from the ease of manipulating children
through corporal punishment, demonstrations of violence, and executions to
dissuade them from escaping or rebelling against the commanders’ orders.113
Occasionally, children are ordered to punish other fighters or civilians that violate
al-Shabaab’s strict rules. As confirmed by Betancourt et al., the punishments
include whippings, identifying lawbreakers, beatings, and sometimes killings
108 West, S. (2016, January 7). Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Offi-
cials. Terrorism Monitor, 14(1). pp. 6–8.
109 Kriel, R. & Duggan, B. (2016, April 1). Al-Shabaab child soldiers captured in Somalia firefight.
CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/africa/al-shabaab-child-soldiers/index.
html Last accessed: 10.08.2020.
110 Human Rights Watch (2012, February 20). No Place for Children. Child Recruitment, Forced
Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/02/20/
no-place-children/child-recruitment-forced-marriage-and-attacks-schools-somalia Last accessed:
26.08.2020; Maruf, H. (2017, September 27). Somali Teenagers Flee Al-Shabaab Recruitment
Campaign. VOA News. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/somali-teenagers-flee-al-
shabab-recruitment-campaign Last accessed: 10.08.2020.
111 Human Rights Watch (2012, February 20). No Place for Children. Child Recruitment, Forced





22 S. S. Jr. F. Regilme and E. Spoldi
which have terrible psychological repercussions.114 In a study conducted with
former recruited children years after their liberation, 48% of those who spent more
than one month with a militia suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, while
one out of four confirmed to still be severely tormented by their times with the
armies.115
The al-Shabaab coercively recruited young girls for diverse purposes,
including cleaning, washing, performing other domestic duties, or to be sex slaves
and wives to the army’s soldiers. In her study on sexual violence on girl soldiers,
Grey states that these girls are highly vulnerable and constantly face the risk of
sexual violence inside the armed group.116 Testimonies reveal that young girls are
also recruited from Muslim and Christian communities, both in Somalia and
Kenya, and promised the possibility to have well-paid jobs in other cities or
countries. These girls are then brought to brothels to provide sexual services for
soldiers or forced into marriages with al-Shabaab militants, often giving birth to
children who are automatically born and raised inside the organization.117
Several scholars affirm that those aforementioned factors and traumatic
experiences create stronger ties within the armed group because, as it occurs
sometimes, children are convinced that they will not be accepted again in civilian
communities, having committed and suffered such terrible acts, so they give up on
a life outside the army.118 When children are abducted or forced to join an armed
group, often the commanders sever the social ties of children with their respective
114 Betancourt, T. S., Brennan, R. T., Rubin-Smith, J., Fitzmaurice, G. M., & Gilman, S. E. (2010).
Sierra Leone’s former child soldiers: a longitudinal study of risk, protective factors, and mental
health. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 49(6). pp. 606–615.
Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157024/ Last accessed: 20.09.
2020.
115 Schauer, E. & Elbert, T. (2010). The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering. InMartz, E. (ed.),
Trauma Rehabilitation After War and Conflict: Community and Individual Perspectives. New York:
Springer. pp. 311–360.
116 Grey, R. (2014). Sexual violence against child soldiers: The limits and potential of interna-
tional criminal law. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 16(4). pp. 601–621.
117 Attwood,C. (2017,May 25).The sex slaves of al-Shabaab. BBCNews.Available at: https://www.
bbc.com/news/magazine-40022953 Last accessed: 26.08.2020.
118 Denov, M. (2010). Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Kiyala, J. C. K. (2015). Challenges of reintegrating self-demobilised
child soldiers in North Kivu Province: Prospects for accountability and reconciliation via Restor-
ative Justice Peacemaking Circles. Human Rights Review, 16(2), 99–122.
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communities and families, as recruiting forces send the children far from their
hometowns in order to make them even more pliable to their orders.119
An additional reason for al-Shabaab to make use of CAAFG is their strategic
and distinctive role in actual combat. Boys are frequently selected to fight against
government forces, clan armies, or AMISOM to protect the more experienced sol-
diers and remove dead or injured bodies from the battlefield.120 In training camps,
al-Shabaab separates children in several groups and teaches themhow to use hand
grenades,firearms, or other explosiveweapons,which are given to themaccording
to their ability to carry different loads, ranging from AK-47s to small pistols.
Besides conventional battle, al-Shabaab uses children as suicide bombers to
attack government’s territories, officials, infrastructures, and the population to
spread terror. One boy, interviewed by Somalia Report, recalled how al-Shabaab
recruited him at 13, through the false promise of financial compensation. He stayed
with the group for four years until his escape a fewweeks before hewould have had
to commit a suicide-bombing in Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport.121
Finally, al-Shabaab deploys indoctrination and propaganda campaigns to
recruit children. Specifically, al-Shabaab militants go to local mosques after
prayers and enter duksis – Quranic schools – to convince boys and girls that the
‘holy’ war is justifiable and would make them good believers, granting them an
‘entry into paradise’ if they were to die as martyrs.122 Ideology constitutes a
fundamental element for the organization, which has pledged allegiance to
al-Qaeda. They use their fanaticism to take back Somali territories, enforcing their
idea of holy law that should govern the cities they seized, as well as convincing
recruited children about the lawful fight they have to sustain in order to stop the
supposed abuses perpetrated by the government.
To conclude, al-Shabaab mainly recruits and uses children for fighting,
thereby confirming the existence of the many factors described in the general
literature review on CAAFG. Al-Shabaab profits from domestic factors, luring
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Children During Armed Conflicts. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 127–154; Honwana, A. (2011).
Child soldiers in Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 5
120 USDepartment of State (2014). Somalia 2014HumanRights Report.CountryReports onHuman
Rights Practices for 2014 – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available at: https://
2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper Last accessed:
15.08.2020.
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children into their ranks by promising jobs, salaries, or a greater role in the so-
called holy war. The recruitment of children provide material benefits to al-
Shabaab because the former add to the number of fighters and perform other
supporting duties in the context of conflict. The ideational factor is embodied in the
religious and jihadi component. Finally, al-Shabaab exploits the inherent char-
acteristics of children of being susceptible to coercion, thereby allowing the mil-
itants to coerce them into violent acts and control them through fear and corporal
punishment.
Furthermore, al-Shabaab largely ignores public international law concerning
children’s rights and international norms on armed conflict. The group, guided by
a strong religious-political ideology, seeks to acquire legitimacy in Somalia and
establish itself as the only rightful regime, able to provide the population with
societal, religious, military, and economic necessities without the assistance from
external ‘apostate’ actors.
2.2 The Government and its Allied Forces
The government of Somalia has a recent history of public promises and pacts, both
internationally and domestically, pledging to stop the recruitment and use of
children in their decades-long armed conflict. In 2012, the TFG signed an action
plan with the support of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). The plan
included ending and preventing the use of children in the SNA, reintegrating
released CAAFG, criminalizing the practice, and granting the UN access to verify
the absence of minors in the forces.123 In 2015, the FGS ratified the CRC; although,
the state never ratified the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in
armed conflict. Article 29(6) of the Somali Constitution states that children have the
right to be protected from being exposed to and used in conflict.124 In November
2017, the FGS decided to start drafting the Child Rights Bill.125
Yet, the report of the Secretary-General about children and armed conflict with
recorded data from 2017, declared once again that in Somalia, 2127 children were
123 United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) (2012, July 3). Somali Transitional Federal
Government Signed an Action Plan to end recruitment and use of children. Available at: https://
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124 The Federal Republic of Somalia (2012, August 1). Provisional Constitution, Art. 29. Available
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125 Cuninghame, C., Kheir, S., Martinez, M. & Rayment, C. (2018). Child Notice Somalia 2018.
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recruited and used in conflict, a significant increase compared to 2016.126 The
report also asserted that although al-Shabaab was the main recruiter, the SNA still
enlisted 119 children. Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a (ASWJ), a moderate Sufis para-
military organization opposed to radical groups like al-Shabaab, recruited 66.
Other armed forces in opposition to al-Shabaab, including the Galmudug, the
Jubbaland forces, and the Somali Police Force, together recruited 91 children.127
Undoubtedly, the government forces have not yet implemented the CRC; nor
have they made significant progress in the Action Plan signed in 2012. Further-
more, it is difficult to obtain reliable information from the SNA about the accurate
number of children that may be part of the army.
The SNA and its associated forces do not apparently intend to abduct children.
The main issue in this case is that Somalia does not have effective and complete
birth registration mechanisms, making it extremely difficult to determine the age
and prove the seniority of SNA recruits, as there are no birth certificates or docu-
ments officially stating their year of birth.128 It is essential for teenagers to be
registered, as they are the most vulnerable in terms of recruitment and cannot
always rely on their appearances to prove their age. Although donor countries that
are involved in cooperating with Somali soldiers in neighboring countries regu-
larly carry out screenings to exclude minors from the troops, this process becomes
difficult when recruits are incorporated in the SNA from other clans and militias
that do not effectively monitor the age of their novices.129 The coalition of forces
opposed to al-Shabaab does not have a formal and central command but consists
of a mixture of militias integrated and coordinated in disparate ways.130 Somali
government officials admitted that when they started building the army to counter
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al-Shabaab as fast as possible, they did not examine whether recruits wereminors,
as long as they could carry a gun.131
The SNA and their supporting forces generally permit children join the army
voluntarily. Whilst the SNA uses adolescents in direct combat against al-Shabaab,
clan militias and smaller armies also assign children domestic tasks, such as food
preparation and guarding checkpoints.132
Children primarily join the SNA and its allied forces in an attempt to escape
from extreme poverty, seek food, protection, money and material benefits that
could help them and their families survive. In addition, an important factor
facilitating the enlistment of children in the SNA is that many see their classmates,
relatives, or friends joining the army for financial compensation and better living
standards.
Many adolescents are also driven by a sense of duty to their families and fellow
citizens who have suffered from the oppression of al-Shabaab for many years and
might want to take revenge. In an interview conducted by The East African
newspaper, a boy recollected how he decided to join the militias close to his town
to take revenge for his father, killed by al-Shabaab. At the time, he did not have any
education and joining the armed group seemed the most logical decision.133
Thus, the Somali government forces take advantage of the domestic factors
mentioned earlier in the article and employ the children mainly as regular sol-
diers, profiting from their participation as additional support in the war against
al-Shabaab.
3 – Child Recruitment and the Broader Structural
Conditions
3.1 Socio-Economic Factors: Lack of External Alternatives
As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons for Somali children enlisted in
armed groups is that oftentimes they do not have viable options for existential
survival and thus perceive recruitment as the rational choice. This absence of
socio-economic opportunities is the result of interrelated factors, such as poverty,
health issues, famine, and lack of education and social support. Furthermore,
131 Gettleman, J. (2010,October 4). Armed&Underage.TheNewYorkTimesUpfront, 143(3). pp. 6–9.
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children are brought to believe that the armed group will provide them with
material and social benefits that could help them survive and provide for them-
selves and their families.134
3.1.1 Poverty, Famine and Insecurity
For years, Somalia has been one of the most materially impoverished countries in
East Africa due to decades of civil war and dysfunctional governance, which were
facilitated by exploitative and violent European colonialism in the African
continent.
The main cause of poverty and health issues especially harming children and
vulnerable groups is structural insecurity. After the ousting of Siad Barre from
power in 1991, a power vacuum left the country without a central government that
could lead the population out of the dictatorship and the crisis. In 2002, approx-
imately 43% of the Somali population was living in conditions of extreme poverty,
which practically meant surviving on less than $1 per day.135 Moreover, malnu-
trition rates were increasing, with one out of four children dying before their fifth
birthday.136 The escalation of structural insecurity that followed the emergence of
al-Shabaab and the subsequent conflict resulted in the obstruction of public goods
provision and the hindrance of investment, consequently throwing the country
further into poverty, especially in the rural areas.
The year 2011 further deteriorated the situation, as the worst famine of the 21st
century hit the country and took the lives of almost 260,000 people.137 Initially
caused by production collapse and a drought, the famine was aggravated by the
lack of preventive measures and by al-Shabaab restricting humanitarian aid from
reaching the most afflicted areas. In order to follow anti-terrorism legislations,
major international donors such as theUS stalled humanitarian aid in the Southern
parts of Somalia controlled by al-Shabaab.138 This catastrophe cost a substantial
number of lives and caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee Somalia and
seek refuge in neighboring countries.
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The repercussions of the famine lasted for several years with two million
people suffering from food insecurity, loss of livelihood, and the general deterio-
ration of living conditions, which internally displaced more than one million So-
malis.139 Children have been among the most vulnerable groups. In 2017, 1.2
million children still suffered from severe malnutrition, with 65% of those being
IDPs. 4.4 million people were left in need of water, hygiene, and sanitation ser-
vices, and 24% of the total population of children under the age of five suffered
from diarrhea at any one time.140
Along with the widespread poverty and famine, the conflict with al-Shabaab
brought even more insecurity into Somali children’s lives. In 2017, more than
700,000 children were internally displaced, and 6.2 million people (of which 3.4
million were children) required humanitarian assistance.141
In most cases, children were left alone because their parents and caregivers
had been killed or injured, and other families did not have enough resources to
take on anothermember.When children did not flee their homes, they had to find a
way to help their families survive. Especially in the most afflicted areas where
agriculture and animal breeding were no longer possible, children often resorted
to illegal means. Under these circumstances, the idea of joining an armed orga-
nization that (misguidedly) appeared to accommodate their needs became an
attractive and necessary alternative to poverty and hunger.
3.1.2 Education
Throughout the years, children’s educational rights have been severely violated.
Machel drew attention to the fact that when governments enter a civil war, the
public spending on education lowers to a minimum to support the costs of the
conflict.142 Therefore, the responsibility of education falls on the communities that
have enough resources to continue or resume it.143 Nonetheless, maintaining a
139 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2014). Somalia: A
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high level of schooling is oftentimes challenging as access to education may be
disrupted and both teachers and children’s lives put at risk. In 2007, right after the
civil war erupted, Somalia’s enrolment rate for primary school was marked as one
of the lowest in the world with 19.9%.144
With the escalation of the civil war, children’s opportunities of a standardized
education further declined. The Global Campaign for Education identified Soma-
lia, together with Haiti, as the worst countries for a child to attend school.145 All the
factions engaged in the war deliberately destroyed or attacked schools during
combat. Even in the absence of an attack, schools closed down due to teachers
and students fleeing their towns or not feeling secure enough to continue their
studies.146
Al-Shabaab raided academic institutions, thereby coercing teachers to either
give a number of students up for recruitment or be killed if they refused. They
restricted the teaching of certain subjects such as English, enforced strict rules on
clothing, and banned non-Arabic signs.147 Moreover, young girls were prohibited
to receive education and forced to either stay home and care for the household or
be recruited in the organization.148 The al-Shabaab also used schools for propa-
ganda campaigns and taught classes on jihad led by members of the radical
organization.149
Interviews with children indicate the consequences of being directly affected
by the conflict and experiencing the loss of relatives and structured education. This
results in a relatively easier recruitment of children who either answer the enlist-
ment campaigns or join the fight forcibly. Specifically, a 15-year-old boy described
how his father’s death left him to care for his mother and brothers and, with no
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possibility of continuing his studies or finding a job, he was taken by al-Shabaab
and was able to escape only after having fought on the frontlines.150 The afore-
mentioned famine caused mass displacement and severe restrictions on water
resources in proximity to schools, which brought about the closure of almost 400
public facilities in the country in just three months.151
Despite the fact that al-Shabaab lost control over themajority of the territories,
the FGS was not able to restore safe provision of education. In fact, in 2017, out of
4.9 million children, 60% were still out of school and 50% abandoned it entirely
before the age of 10.152
The foregoing discussions on poverty, insecurity, and education demonstrate
that children’s rights in Somalia have been violated on multiple levels and
aggravated by the longstanding armed conflict.We argue that, on the one hand, al-
Shabaab, the SNA and the other militias have exploited the extremely poor living
conditions of children. Amidst this already complex scenario, children cannot be
supported by teachers and cannot receive a proper education,whichmakes itmore
difficult for them to find safer means of securing material resources for survival.
Consequently, the armed belligerents are able to allure them into taking up arms,
in exchange for a salary or other material benefits, such as food or shelter, or the
feeling of security and power that armed combat could possibly give to soldiers.153
In order to replenish their armies, armed groups do not carry out appropriate
screening processes among the recruited soldiers. Screenings would allow them to
identify those children that, left alone to face a crisis bigger than them, volun-
tarily enlist in an attempt to escape acute poverty, starvation, and oftentimes
abandonment.
3.2 Childhood in the Midst of Violence
Our second principal finding underscores that children may decide to become
soldiers because they do not perceive war as entirely wrong; they normalized
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violence, and they want to help their families and communities to re-establish a
peaceful existence, driven by a patriotic sentiment.154 However, the only way they
know to put an end to the perpetrated attacks is to fight back.
Childhood is an important formative period for emotional, cognitive, and
physical and social development.155 Klasen et al. claim that as children grow up,
they learn and acquire knowledge from what surrounds them, which includes
traumatic experiences that may have detrimental impact on their development.156
In Somalia, today’s children were born and raised during a conflict of which they
understand neither the initial causes nor the reasons for which it is still happening.
The majority of them grew up constantly fearing for their own and their parents’
lives, being forced to escape from their native communities and live in refugee
camps, risking to be recruited in armed forces or to be exploited for labour
or sexual purposes, and ultimately trying to survive a dreadful war that has
persistently characterized their everyday lives.
Several scholars have affirmed that the consequences of war on young boys
and girls are immensely catastrophic: children become distressed, inert, and dis-
orientated by the brutality they witness, which might create the opportune con-
ditions for children to voluntarily enlist.157 Children’s development is marked by
what they are taught in their society. In Somalia, children have not been socialized
to find solutions to end the evolving war but have rather been accustomed to the
prospect of becoming fighters and assuming belligerent attitudes, gangster-like
culture, and a general approach leaning towards violence.158 Their understanding
of violence andwarmakes children’s approach to society and the establishment of
healthy relationships with their peers and other adults vastly problematic.159
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In addition to witnessing the destruction of their villages and lands on a daily
basis, children have been victims of killings, torture, ill-treatment, and other
abuses.160 In 2010, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that the
two main hospitals of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, received more than 2300
children and women suffering war-related wounds, making up more than 40% of
the entire number of patients in their clinics.161
Especially in the areas controlled by al-Shabaab, children have been obliged
to attend public punishments of relatives, friends, and people from their com-
munities accused of violating the holy law, the Shari’a. Minors have been regularly
sentenced to flogging, stoning, amputations, and beatings because they did not
obey the rules. For instance, the dress code included a mandatory hijab and
sometimes the abaya – the first is the Islamic headscarf, while the second is the
traditional over-gown – for girls.162 To cite an example of a child’s punishment as
perpetrated by the extremist organization, Amnesty International described the
death by stoning of a 13-year-old girl, whohadpreviously been raped by threemen,
yet was accused by al-Shabaab of having been adulterous.163
Another problem is that, although children are deeply disturbed by the armed
conflict, once they have managed to find some sort of refuge, most often no pro-
fessional help is available, leaving them alone to deal with their own traumas. This
can only add to the multiple hazards that children have suffered in Somalia in the
past decades.
We argue that, as children have seen their own lives disrupted and their
country devastated by the different parties to the conflict, they have been brought
to develop a sentiment of collective pride that propelled them to enlist, in one
faction or the other, to put an end to the conflict. Perhaps the choice of becoming
CAAFG came about on the grounds that Somali children have never experienced
structural peace164 during their lifetime. Even though they dream and want to
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eventually achieve a Somalia without armed hostilities, the only way familiar to
them to fight for the freedomof their country, its people, and a nonviolent future, is
through armed conflict itself. We maintain that, in regard to Somali children who
voluntarily enlist, the traumatic experiences they have endured have led to a
‘normalization’ of violencewhich has brought them to believe that joining an army
and participate in the war is a rational and natural choice.
To conclude, the factors discussed in this section – insecurity, poverty,
malnutrition, lack of education, violent childhood, normalization of conflict, and a
patriotic sentiment – are interrelated. Those factors explain why child recruitment
remains a prevalent phenomenon in Somalia amongst all the fighting factions. We
found that these factors are especially applicable in terms of voluntary recruit-
ment: a phenomenon that is common to al-Shabaab, the SNA, and the other minor
supporting forces. Furthermore, even though the term ‘voluntary’ is used, we
argue that the decision made by Somali children is not entirely a matter of freewill
but a combination of the various aforementioned structural factors that enable
Somali government agents and armed rebel leaders to forcibly recruit children as
soldiers.
4 Conclusions
Why do armed rebel groups and state forces deploy children in armed conflict,
particularly in Somalia? We critically reviewed the general literature on the role of
children in armed conflict, and we analyzed how and under which conditions the
Somalian stakeholders deploy minors. Our analysis analytically described how al-
Shabaab has systematically violated relevant instruments of public international
law that explicitly prohibit the mobilization of children in armed conflict.
The two main parties in the conflict have dissimilar methods and diverse
motives in recruiting children into their ranks. On the one hand, al-Shabaab is
more likely to abduct and to force children into becoming soldiers. On the other
hand, although being aware of the presence ofminors among their armies, the SNA
and associated forces generally do not implement any screening mechanisms that
would systematically and accurately identify and therefore exclude children from
fighting alongside adult soldiers.
The government forces treat and use children as if they were of legal age,
mainly for combat purposes and to make sure they always have physically ready
fighters. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab has exploited children not only through the
deployment in the armed conflict’s frontlines but also tasking such minors as
suicide-bombers, camp guards, cooks, porters, spies, and in case of girls, as sex
slaves (and forcibly married to the rebel group’s leaders).
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Our analysis focused on the two structural factors that make child recruitment
still prevalent in the Somali conflict. We contend that children are structurally
driven to join al-Shabaab, the SNA, or the other militias because of two main
reasons. The first is primarily correlated to domestic factors, whereby such minors
face the absence of alternative sources of social support andmeans of survival. The
Somali civil war has resulted in the deterioration of the public goods provision
system, which in turn, generated a structural condition of extreme poverty,
malnutrition,water scarcity, economic decay, and environmental devastation. The
enduring armed conflict has generated the traumatization of children, thereby
normalizing violence that motivates some children to take up arms in a desperate
attempt to put an end to a war. Indeed, Somali armed groups contribute to recruit
children, particularly through propaganda campaigns that falsely inform minors
of the supposed material benefits and status recognition they could gain from
participation in armed conflict.
As a caveat, our findings, however, have its own limitations: directly gathering
official information from Somali sources is problematic. That is because of the
absence of comprehensive numerical data on children, starting from birth registra-
tions and updated data on deployed soldiers in the ongoing armed conflict. Somalia
has not only been bearing the fight between government forces and al-Shabaab, but
it has witnessed internal disputes over territories and the involvement of other
actors, such as pirates, who have contributed to the deepening of the country’s
fractures by allyingwith one faction or the other tomainly pursue their own financial
interests. Additionally, international actors including AMISOM, the US, and the UN
have also played a role in the civil war. All these different actors make it difficult to
have a comprehensive and clear picture of the armed conflict in Somalia.
Our findings here contribute to existing policy and scholarly debates con-
cerning children in armed conflict. First, we underscored how structural-material
vis-à-vis ideational factors in a given society function as background conditions
that facilitate the deployment of minors in wars. Second, the recruitment and
mobilization of children in armed conflict constitutes a grave human rights abuse,
and this particular problem should be taken up in key global governance agendas.
Third, our analysis is fully embedded within the relevant literature on public
international law on children’s rights, international norms on armed conflict, and
political violence — thereby demonstrating the need for a multidisciplinary sen-
sibility in human rights law. Fourth, our analysis of recruited children in Somalia
suggests that international human rights law, including children’s rights, should
be situated within the highly contested terrain of political contestations: compli-
ance with human rights obligations is likely to succeed when policy approaches
deal with the broader structural-material and ideational conditions that could
motivate actors from disengaging in armed conflict.
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Finally, there are further questions and issues that may be taken up for future
research on children in armed conflict. Policy approaches that deal with children
in armed conflict should adopt a more comprehensive strategy that strengthens
national and regional judicial institutions and civil society activism that could
facilitate criminal accountability upon perpetrators. Notably, Somali justice sys-
tem has recently adopted a trend that has occurred in other countries perpetrating
the crime of child recruitment, such as Uganda, where domestic courts aggres-
sively prosecute recruited children after their exit from the armed groups.165 In the
Somali judicial system, this allows the police to arrest and prosecute children for
their involvement with al-Shabaab. This practice removes the children’s right to be
assisted and reintegrated into society, as it was declared by the national pro-
gramme that stipulates the mandatory handover of released or escaped CAAFG to
UNICEF for rehabilitation within 72 h.166 Instead, former child combatants have
been detained and sentenced to spend time in prison varying from six years to life.
The military court also sentenced 10 children to death, violating the international
norm that prohibits the execution of child criminals, to later commute the sentence
on appeal.167 Thus, the prevention of children frompotential involvement in armed
conflict requires sustainable structural reforms that prevent all actors from taking
up arms, thereby including policies that generate equitable economic growth and
long-term investments in public goods provision. There should be a committed
long-term institutionalization of programs that aim to reintegrate former soldiers
in the wider society, particularly through public investments in mental and
physical rehabilitation, economic livelihood, health, education, and public order.
Future research and policymaking regarding Somalia should also concentrate on
factors such as acute poverty, governance, the re-construction of towns and farms
in rural areas, and the birth registration mechanisms, that could help the future
generations exit the humanitarian and insecurity crisis through various correc-
tional, vocational, and educational programs focusing on children’s resilience in
their post-traumatic growth.168 In 2018, the Somali population between 0 and 14
165 Rosen, D.M. (2015).Child Soldiers in theWestern Imagination: FromPatriots toVictims. Rutgers
University Press.
166 Human Rights Watch (2018, February). “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison”. Abuses Against
Boys Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/somalia0218_web.pdf Last accessed: 27.08.2020.
167 Ibid, pp. 36–37.
168 Werner, E. E. (2012). Children and war: Risk, resilience, and recovery. Development and
psychopathology, 24(2). p. 553; Blattman, C., & Annan, J. (2010). The consequences of child sol-
diering. The review of economics and statistics, 92(4). pp. 882–898; Drumbl, M. A. (2012). Reima-
gining child soldiers in international law and policy. Oxford University Press. p. 122.
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years of age was estimated to be 46.57% of the total.169 In a country where almost
half of the society is under 15 years of age, international and regional cooperation
efforts should focus first and foremost on establishing high-quality education and
socio-economic welfare systems in Somalia. In that way, the promotion of chil-
dren’s rights constitutes a holistic approach, ranging from the protection of their
right to life, education, health, and decent standard of living.
Appendix 1
International Humanitarian Law
Customary International Humanitarian Law170
– Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945)
– Geneva Convention I, II, III, IV (1949)
– Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions I, II, III (1977)
– Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)
International Human Rights Law
Customary International Human Rights Law
– ILO Convention 29 (1930)
– UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
– International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
– Convention Against Torture (1984)
– Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
– UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection and Care of Refugee Children (1991)
– UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)
– ILO Convention 182 (1999)
– Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict (2000)
– Paris Principles (2007)
169 World Bank (2018). Population ages 0–14 (% of total population) – Somalia. The
World Bank Data. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?
end=2018&locations=SO&start=2018&view=bar Last accessed: 15.08.2020.
170 International treaties bind only those states that have signed and ratified them. Customary
law is universally binding.
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Signatures and Ratification of Somalia
Laws, conventions and treaties Signed Ratified
Geneva conventions I–IV ✓  ✓ 
Additional protocols I–III
Rome statute of the international criminal court
Statute of the international court of justice ✓  ✓ 
Convention on the rights of the child ✓  ✓ 
Optional protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in
armed conflict
✓ 
Covenant on civil and political rights ✓ 
Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights ✓ 
ILO convention  ✓ ✓ 
ILO convention  ✓ ✓ 
UN convention against torture ✓ 
African charter on the rights and welfare of the child ✓ 
African charter on human and peoples’ rights ✓  ✓ 
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